

Learning from Results Based Financing: The World Bank's Experience in Africa


**HEALTH RESULTS INNOVATION TRUST FUND** 



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# The RBF Portfolio

- 30 countries with 36 Country Pilot Grants
- HRITF has committed \$396 million, linked to \$2.2 billion financing from IDA



### **RBF** models:

- Performance Based Financing
- Vouchers (CCT),
- Community RBF,
- Cash on Delivery

## RBF is a health system intervention



#### **COMMUNITY**

#### Stakeholder support

Public policies

Institutional capacity

#### **HEALTH SYSTEM**

#### **HEALTH FACILITY**

#### **Key Behavioral Attributes**

Understanding

Expectancy

Valence

**STRATEGIC** 

**PURCHASING** 

Buy-in

Perceived fairness

#### **Program Design & Implementation**

- Contract with PBF indicators
- Increased autonomy
- Performance payment (size and frequency of performance payment, distribution mechanism, individual vs. facility levels, additional resources)
- Data reporting
- Capacity building

#### **Organizational Changes**

Improved clarity of priorities 1, 4, 5

Autonomous facilities allocate resources better through management & leadership response 2, 5

Facilities get paid more/more productive staff 1, 3

Change in trade-off between user fees & number of patients 1, 3

Change in value of being client-friendly 3

Improved transparency & accountability 1, 4, 6, 7

Use of data for decision-making 1, 2, 4, 6

Better prepared facilities (inputs, training, etc.) 3, 5, 7

#### **Behavioral Changes**

Improved motivation & morale 2, 3

Improved teamwork & collaboration

1, 3

Improved communication & awareness 1, 4, 5, 6, 7

Improved perceived control

2, 4

Increased demand for knowledge

1, 2, 4

## **Program Design & Implementation**

6 Verification

7 Supervision

Health system pillars:

- (i) Service delivery
- (ii) Human resources
- (iii) Financing
- (iv) Governance
- (v) Medicines/ commodities
- (vi) Information

Geography/ remoteness Cultural values. attitudes & perceptions

Socioeconomic Status

Demand for services

**IMPROVED AVAILABILITY & QUALITY OF SERVICE DELIVERY** 


Health service utilization

Legal framework

Governance

**IMPROVED HEALTH OUTCOMES** 


Learning from Implementation



# Tracking Operational Data in Nigeria

# COVERAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL DELIVERY


# Coverage increases sustained over phases



## **QUALITY OF CARE**

**Nigeria** 

# Dynamic quality measures improve outcomes




## Cameroon

# **Qualitative Learning**

Respondents included health care providers and administrative/regulatory bodies

## **Qualitative Component of IE included:**

- In-depth interviews
- Focus groups discussions



### **Results:**

- Average total quality of care score increased from 43% to 64% between 2012 and 2015
- Service providers and regulatory agents have a strong desire for the PBF program to continue
- Increased collaboration among the various stakeholders
- Enhanced transparency and accountability in resource management
- Increased satisfaction among both providers and patients

# Rwanda

**Rwanda** 



- PBF at the health facility level was scaled up nationally in 2008
- Community PBF (Second Generation)
  - Since 2009, Community Health Workers (CHWs) were paid for reporting on health indicators in their communities
  - Additional components were added through the Community Performance-Based Financing Program in order to promote targeted services.
- The IE evaluated the impact of 2 interventions that were added to the scheme:
  - 1. Performance incentives for CHW cooperatives
  - 2. Demand-side in-kind incentives
- Qualitative study in progress



# Second generation IE: Cooperatives & In-Kind Incentives

## **Performance Incentives for Coop**

- No impact of incentives to CHW cooperative on targeted indicators, CHW behaviors and CHW motivation.
- Potential reasons for lack of impact
- Incentives were too low
- Collective reward but individual effort
- Pay-for-reporting could have already oriented the CHWs towards targeted indicators
- Limited scope given the many supplyside programs targeting the same indicators

#### **Demand-side in-kind Incentives**

- The demand-side in-kind incentives caused an increase in timely ANC and PNC services
- Despite some challenges in procurement frequent stock outs
- Although some health centers independently implemented their own demand-side incentives strategies to promote utilization
- Although program ended before end-line data collection
- Consistent with findings in other countries



# Study Design

Zambia





30 districts triplet-matched on key health systems and outcome indicators and randomly allocated to 3 arms:

10 RBF Intervention Districts (RBF)

10 Input-Based Financing Districts (C1)

10 Pure Control Districts (C2)





Rate of in-facility deliveries increased by ~13% in RBF districts





# **Key Findings**

- Sizable gains in some key coverage indicators:
  - in-facility delivery rate, earlier presentation for ANC care,
    maintenance of immunization coverage
- RBF facilities report
  - higher availability of equipment
  - higher autonomy
  - more satisfied staff
- Enhanced financing: during implementation, C1 received funds but not to the level of RBF districts – roughly half as much – and were restricted in fund use
  - No incentives to individual workers, only facility strengthening
- Preliminary analysis suggests some gains from enhanced financing
  - Large gain in in-facility delivery rate as well as gains in client satisfaction, some ANC process measures, and FP outreach
  - No change in other coverage indicators vaccination, any ANC
  - Cost effectiveness analysis to compare the two financing modes is underway







# **Key Learnings from Experience**

## Data is vital and could be better mined

# **Keep quality measures dynamic**

Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI)

## Match demand and supply

(Nigeria LGAs Barriers: Transportation Challenges, variable & unpredictable fees for Services and Drugs, Social and cultural Barriers)

Results measurement and verification itself bring changes

Strong implementation support is important

# **Complex interplay of issues**

(autonomy, supervision, accountability)

